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Summary: The purpose of this study is the examination of the relationship
between fiscal and Current Account balances for the countries of southern
eurozone. The twin deficit hypothesis is tested within the context of a portfolio
model involving variables from the financial sector. Empirical analysis is con-
ducted with panel data, for the period 1991-2011. Evidence is provided to sup-
port the twin deficit hypothesis. Additionally, it is found that it is not only the 
fiscal policy of the southern eurozone coun-tries that affects their Current Ac-
count balances, but also the fiscal policy of the eurozone surplus countries of
the north. Interdependence of euro-zone countries suggests that fiscal policy 
can be used for the elimination of external disequilibrium. Therefore, fiscal
policy should be coordinated but not uniformly applied.
Key words: Current Account, Budget balance, Twin deficits, Financial integra-
tion, Fiscal coordination. 
JEL: F32, F36, F41.
 
 
 
Analysis of the relationship between the Current Account (CA) and fiscal policy has 
attracted theoretical as well as empirical attention. There are two major competing 
theories: the positive association of CA deficit and the government budget deficit, 
known as the twin deficit hypothesis which derives from the Keynesian tradition. 
According to this view an expansionary fiscal policy stimulates output and demand 
which has a deteriorating influence on the CA. On the other hand, the two deficits are 
not related according to the Ricardian Equivalence approach. Any fiscal expansion, 
or contraction induces intertemporal reallocation of savings, leaving the CA balance 
unaltered. In line to this approach, an increase in the budget deficit increases private 
saving and has no effect on the CA. Whether or not, the two deficits are positively 
related has important policy implications. If the twin deficit hypothesis is valid, a 
government can improve the country’s CA through a fiscal contraction and vice 
versa. 
Empirical research for individual countries or group of countries has provided 
unclear results. Evidence in support of the twin deficit hypothesis primarily comes 
from the US experience in the 1980s and 2000s (John D. Abell 1990a, b; Abdulnas-
ser Hatemi-J and Ghazi Shukur 2002; Jeffrey Frankel 2006). In Sebastian Edwards 
(2005) and Olivier Blanchard (2007a, b) it is claimed that CA deficits of the US and 
other rich countries have their origins in private saving and investment decisions and 
that fiscal deficits often play a marginal role. For the US there are other empirical 
studies verifying a negative relation between the two deficits. When fiscal account  
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worsens, the CA improves, as in Nouriel Roubini (2006), Soyoung Kim and Roubini 
(2008). There are numerous other studies that confirm the twin deficit hypothesis for 
other countries, such as Ahmad Zubaidi Baharumshah and Evan Lau (2007) for the 
case of Thailand. Also, Branko Urošević, Milan Nedeljković, and Emir Zildžović 
(2012) find a positive relation between fiscal balance and the Current Account for the 
case of Serbia, Romania, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. Vince Daly and 
Jalal Siddiki (2010) test the hypothesis for OECD countries, with cointegration 
analysis. In 13 out of 23 OECD countries for the period 1960-2000, the twin deficit 
hypothesis is accepted. Empirical studies dealing with the impact of budget deficits 
on CA balances for eurozone countries are inconclusive. Evidence from George 
Vamvoukas (1999) and also from Panagiotis Pantelidis et al. (2009) for the period 
1960-2007 confirm the twin deficit hypothesis for the case of Greece. On the other 
hand Theodore Papadogonas and Yiannis Stournaras (2006) provide support to the 
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis for the EU member states. According to them, CA 
developments are explained by factors related to financial and economic integration. 
Sylvia Kaufmann, Johann Scharler, and Georg Winckler (2002) reject the twin defi-
cit hypothesis for Austria. Melina Vasarthani et al. (2010) estimate a model for the 
determination of the CA for the EU countries with panel data, over the period 1980-
2008. Their results provide a weak support to the twin deficit hypothesis. 
This study is structured as follows. Section 1 presents the evolution of the 
variables describing the fiscal situation, the CA balance and the main financial vari-
ables for the southern eurozone countries. Section 2 offers the theoretical background 
of the relation between the two deficits. In this section a portfolio model is used to 
explain developments in the CA and budget balances. Factors related to financial and 
economic integration such as interest rates and growth differentials are essential 
characteristics of this model. Section 3 provides empirical evidence based on panel 
data from southern eurozone countries, over the period 1991-2010. Finally, Section 4 
concludes with a summary of our results. 
 
1. The Data 
 
This section starts by comparing the CA and fiscal balance situation. The year 1991 
marks the beginning of the convergence period for the first group of the 11 EU coun-
tries that joined the EMU in 1999, and Greece that joined in 2001. The first stage of 
convergence as determined in the Delors report starts in mid-1990. The group of eu-
rozone countries includes the southern European Union (EU) countries, that is, 
Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, and also Cyprus and Slovenia. A weak and deteriorat-
ing external sector is a common feature of these countries, with Greece and Portugal 
being in the worst position. This can be observed in Figure 1 that shows the course of 
the CA as a percentage of GDP. The CA surpluses of Italy and France have turned 
into deficits since 2004 and of Cyprus since 2001. We notice a temporary improve-
ment in CA deficits lasting for two or three years after the introduction of the euro 
and also for the years 2009-2010, as a consequence of the economic crisis. CA defi-
cits have piled up to a rising external debt over the years. With respect to the net ex-
ternal debt position, measured by the Net International Investment Position as a per-
centage of GDP, Greece Portugal and Spain are in the worst position, once again.  
163  Financial Integration, Euro and the Twin Deficits of Southern Eurozone Countries 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2013, 2, Special Issue, pp. 161-178
Figure 2 shows public debt and the Net International Investment Position as percent-
ages of GDP of the countries of our group. By looking at the charts of Figure 2, it is 
concluded that some countries suffer from a dual problem: high public debt ratios 
matched with high or even higher external debt ratios. These countries are Greece, 
Portugal and Spain and to a much lesser extent Italy and Slovenia. Cyprus has a posi-
tive Net International Investment position, while France has started having an exter-
nal debt since 2008. The question that arises is what have been the sources of financ-
ing the net external debt of Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy since mid -1990s. The 
answer is related to the financial integration of EU and the creation of the euro that 
have eased borrowing conditions for both the public and private sector.  
Interest rates fell rapidly during the convergence period in all countries of our 
sample. After the euro was introduced and before the advent of the economic crisis, 
long run interest rates of all countries of our sample almost coincided with the excep-
tion of Slovenia and Cyprus. However, after 2008, the difference between the long 
run interest rate of each individual country and that of Germany increased reflecting 
default risk that these countries were facing to a smaller or larger degree. Short run 
interest rates of all countries of south eurozone also followed a downward path, dur-
ing the 1990s. Since early 2000, short run rates were kept at low levels an in accor-
dance to the ECB base rate.   
The countries of our group share a characteristic of their external sector that is 
worth noting: their trade balance with respect to other EU countries has been in defi-
cit since 2000. The annual sum of the trade deficits has been increasing since then 
and is matched by a widening surplus of a different group of eurozone countries 
(Figure 3). This second group is comprised by surplus eurozone countries. These are 
Germany, Belgium, Ireland, Netherlands and Slovakia. The widening disequilibrium 
between the two groups reveals a severe loss in competitiveness for the deficit coun-
tries, after the introduction of the euro.
1 We are going to refer to the group of south-
ern EU countries as the deficit group and to the other group as the surplus group. 
Regarding the government budget balance, we observe in Figure 1 that it has been 
in deficit in all the countries of our group for all the years under consideration. Budget 
deficits as a percentage of GDP have improved during the 1990s. Loosening fiscal poli-
cies, after attaining the accession to EMU criteria have increased fiscal deficits in all 
countries of our group, with the exception of Spain. Public debt of the eurozone as a 
whole did not exceed 70% of GDP for the period covering the years 2000-2008. Figure 2 
shows the stock of public debt as a percentage of GDP. We can observe the performance 
of the public debt/GDP, for the case of Italy and Spain. In Italy, the public debt as a per-
centage of GDP fell from a high of 121.84 in 1994 to 103.62 in 2007 and in Spain it fell 
from a high of 67.45 in 1996 to 36.13 in 2007. In 2010 as a consequence of the economic 
crisis, public debt climbed to unprecedented levels. It reached 142.75% of GDP in 
Greece, 119% in Italy, 93% in Portugal, 81.70% in France, 60.11% in Spain, 60.80% in 
Cyprus and 38.00% in Slovenia. 
 
 
  
                                                        
1 Slovenia joined EMU in 2007 and Cyprus in 2008 but for two years before their economies were func-
tioning with fixed exchange rates, under the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II).  
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Note: Column: current account (% GDP). Line: budget balance (% GDP).
 
Source: AMECO, European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs. 
 
Figure 1  Current Account and Government Budget Balances, 1991-2011 (% GDP) 
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Note: Column: international investment position (% GDP). Line: public debt (% GDP).
 
Source: AMECO, European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs. 
 
Figure 2  Public Debt and the International Investment Position (% GDP) 
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Note: Intra eurozone deficit includes: trade deficits of Austria, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Luxemburg, Cyprus, 
Malta and Slovenia. Intra eurozone surplus includes: trade surpluses of Germany, Belgium, Ireland, Holland and Slovakia, 
with other eurozone countries. 
 
Source: AMECO, European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs. 
 
Figure 3  Intra Eurozone Trade 
 
2. Theoretical Background   
 
The relationship between the two balances derives from the basic macroeconomic 
identity, according to which the CA is equal to the difference between national sav-
ing, S and investment, I: 
  
CA= S-I  (1)
 
Breaking down S and I into their public and private sector components, (1) 
becomes: 
 
CA = (Sp-Ip) + (Sg-Ig)  (2)
 
where subscript p denotes private sector and subscript g denotes and public sector.  
From (2), the CA is related to the excess public saving (Sg-Ig), which corre-
sponds to the budget balance. Hence equation (2) is used as a basis for discussing the 
twin deficit hypothesis. A positive relation between CA and excess government sav-
ing holds only under the condition that the difference between Sp and Ip remains 
constant. The course of (Sp-Ip) is crucial for the twin deficit hypothesis. 
 
2.1 Channels through which the Budget Balance Influences the Current 
Account and vice versa 
 
The two balances influence each other through various channels. Theoretical support 
to the twin deficit hypothesis and causality running from the public deficit to the ex-
ternal deficit derives mainly from the conventional Keynesian and Mundell-Fleming 
approach. 
First, according to the Keynesian tradition, an expansionary fiscal policy 
stimulates income and deteriorates the CA. This is true irrespective of exchange rate 
regime, capital mobility situation or phase of the business cycle of the economy. 
Secondly, in a Mundell-Fleming framework (John M. Fleming 1967; Robert Mundell 
1968), with perfect capital mobility and negligible transaction costs, fiscal expansion 
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increases real interest rates that in turn trigger capital inflows. As a result, real ex-
change rate appreciates, deteriorating the CA. 
Causality running from the CA balance to the budget balance is supported by 
other views. Financial integration and easier access to borrowing for member coun-
tries causes deterioration of their CA balances, raising questions of sustainability by 
financial markets. Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas (2002), among others, argue that gov-
ernments should protect their economies from such a potential by lowering public 
deficits. If such a policy is implemented, the two deficits are inversely related and the 
twin deficit hypothesis does not apply.  
An inverse relation between the two deficits was found in the US, for the pe-
riod 1973-2004, by Kim and Roubini (2008). The observed “twin divergence” as 
they call it is in effect when the main driver of the two balances is an output shock. 
They claim that because during economic recessions unemployment is high and out-
put falls, fiscal policy is expansionary thus stimulating economic activity. Therefore, 
the budget balance worsens. At the same time, as spending falls, the CA improves. 
On the contrary during the booms, when the economic activity is high, the fiscal bal-
ance improves implying coexistence of deteriorating CA balances and improving 
budget balances. Consequently, according to them there is no causal effect between 
the two deficits but there exists an inverse association. 
Joseph E. Stiglitz (2010) supports the twin deficit hypothesis, with causality 
running from the CA to the budget balance. He argues that countries with persistent 
or expanding CA deficits are often obliged to run fiscal deficits to maintain aggregate 
demand. “Without the fiscal deficit, they will have high unemployment.” (Stiglitz 
2010, p. 235). 
The synchronized variation in private sector’s saving and investment, known 
as the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle (Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka 2008), sup-
ports the twin deficit hypothesis, as can be inferred from equation (2) (Blanchard and 
Francesco Giavazzi 2002; Carlos Foncesa Marinheiro 2008). More recent empirical 
work has proved that the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle is no longer valid. Neither is the 
twin deficit hypothesis. 
João Sousa Andrade and Adelaide Duarte (2011) indicates a different source 
of connection between the two deficits. According to him the twin deficit phenome-
non in Portugal is the result of monetary integration and poor policies. Falling inter-
est rates created a kind of Dutch disease that produced high budget and CA deficits 
as well as external debt. 
An alternative approach known as the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis sug-
gests no relation between the two deficits (Robert Barro 1974, 1989). The Ricardian 
Equivalence predicts that a fiscal expansion has a positive effect of the same size on 
private saving, while real interest rates, investment and CA balance remain unaf-
fected. Papadogonas and Stournaras (2006) empirical findings support this view. 
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2.2 A Portfolio Model 
 
Whatever the underlying forces of the two deficits are, widening imbalances in the 
euro area countries cannot be explained without considering the effect of financial 
and economic integration and the common currency. Below we construct a portfolio 
model in the context of which the relation between CA and budget balances can be 
discussed. Under the condition of financial integration and a single currency, it is 
assumed that short run interest rates are common for all countries, while long run 
interest rates may differ. Therefore, financial assets bearing different rates of return 
are not perfect substitutes in the portfolios of investors. Let us assume, for simplicity, 
that prices are constant and that the Union we are referring to is comprised of two 
countries representing two groups with distinct characteristics. The first is the surplus 
countries group comprised by countries of the core of the currency union. Deficit 
countries make up the second group. The difference between the two groups is that 
all indicators of real variables, such as income per capita, distribution of income, 
competitiveness of the economy, as well as the structure of production and institu-
tional framework, are superior in the surplus group to those of the deficit group. 
Also, the financial sector of the surplus group is more developed and efficient. Defi-
cit countries benefit from the formation of the currency union with the surplus group, 
in terms of lower nominal and real interest rates and easier access to borrowing, in 
general. This situation induces widening deficits in both fiscal and CA balances. 
It is also assumed that the external sector of the union as a whole is in balance. 
Thus, the CA surplus of the first group equals the deficit of the second. At this stage, 
for simplicity of analysis, the two country groups will be referred to as countries: the 
deficit countries group will be the “home” country while the surplus group will be 
the “foreign” country. The CA balance is equal to the change in the net holdings of 
foreign assets held by domestic residents. If it is positive it corresponds to the coun-
try’s net lending abroad, if negative, to net borrowing from abroad: 
 
CA= Δ(F-B)  (3)
 
where, Δ, denotes first difference. F is the holdings of foreign assets by domestic 
residents and B is the holdings of domestic assets by foreign residents. It is assumed 
that foreign assets, F, are comprised by bonds issued by the government or the pri-
vate sector of the foreign country, with an average rate of return Rf, whereas, B, do-
mestic assets are bonds issued by the government or the private sector of the home 
country, with an average rate of return Rb. Residents of the union can hold their fi-
nancial wealth in the form of money, M, or bonds F, or B. Money, M, has also a rate 
of return equal to Rm. The rate of return of each form of asset is its interest rate. 
Hence demand for each asset
2 depends positively on its own interest rate, negatively 
on the other assets’ interest rates and it also depends on income, Y. Subsequently, 
demand for foreign assets Fd, by domestic residents, is a function of Rf, Rb, Rm and 
Y, the income of the home country: 
 
                                                        
2 Demand for F corresponds to the (supply of) lending by domestic residents to foreigners. Similarly, 
demand for B corresponds to the (supply of) lending to domestic residents by foreigners.  
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) , , , (
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (    
 Y R R R f Fd m b f d   (4)
 
Signs of (+) or (-) denote the sign of partial derivative of the demand for F 
with respect to corresponding variables in (4). Similarly, demand for domestic bonds 
Bd, is described in equation (5): 
 
*) , , , (
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (    
 Y R R R b Bd m b f d   (5)
 
The star (*) refers to foreign country variables. 
To determine the factors affecting the assets supply side we argue that B and F 
are issued by the corresponding country’s government or private sector, to finance 
their borrowing requirements. The higher the stock of public debt (PDebt) is, the 
higher the stock of bonds that have been issued is. Also, the lower the interest rate is 
the higher the supply of bonds is. Therefore, supply of foreign bonds,
3 Fs, depends 
positively on the foreign country’ stock of public debt, PDebt* and negatively on Rf. 
Supply of domestic bonds, depends positively on PDebt and negatively on Rb. 
 
) *, (
) ( ) (
f s R Debt P f Fs
 
   (6)
 
) , (
) ( ) (
b s R Debt P b Bs
 
   (7)
 
Consequently, when demand of each asset is equal to its supply, the actual 
stock of F and B depends on all forces included in corresponding demand and supply 
functions: 
 
) * , , , , (
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( (?)    
 PDebt Y R R R f F m b f  
(8)
 
) * , * , , , (
) ( ) ( ) ( (?) ) (    
 PDebt Y R R R b B m b f  
(9)
 
In (8) the direction of influence of Rf  on F depends on whether the effect 
originates from the demand for foreign bonds, F (supply of lending) or the effect 
originating from the supply of F (demand for borrowing). The same holds for the 
ambiguous effect of Rb on the stock of bonds, B, in (9). By substituting the equilib-
rium equations (8) and (9) in (3) we end up with the CA balance as a function of 
variables coming from the asset market: 
 
                                                        
3 Supply of F corresponds to the demand for borrowing by foreigners, while supply of B corresponds to 
the demand for borrowing by domestic residents.  
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) * , , * , , , , (
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( (?) (?)     
  PDebt PDebt Y Y R R R B F m b f         and 
)) * , , * , , , , ( ( ) (
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( (?) (?) (?)    
     PDebt PDebt Y Y R R R B F CA m b f   
(10)
 
If additionally we assume that a change in the stock of public debt corresponds 
to that year’s budget balance, BB, with the opposite sign, we can rewrite (10) as:  
 
) * , , * , , , , (
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( (?) (?)     
      BB BB Y Y R R R CA m b f   
(11)
 
Again, the effect of a change in Rf or Rb on the CA balance is subject to the 
dominance of the effect from the demand or the supply side of the relevant bonds 
market. It is noted that the CA is influenced by the change in interest rates and not by 
their levels. 
Next we shall discuss the effect of financial integration on the CA balance and 
its relation with the budget balance. Within our framework of analysis, financial in-
tegration causes stronger adjustments in the home country
  representing weaker 
economies, than in the foreign country. The government of the home country takes 
the opportunity to increase its borrowing to finance its requirements by increasing the 
supply of government bonds, B. In turn, this inflates public debt, as well as the 
budget deficit by the same amount, ceteris paribus. The increase in the supply of B, 
given the fact that there exists sufficient demand for domestic bonds, increases the 
stock of bonds, B, in the home country. From (3) CA=Δ(F-B), it is implied that the 
CA balance deteriorates. Moreover, unless other adjustments are made, the deteriora-
tion of the CA is matched by a deterioration of the budget balance. Therefore, the 
twin deficit hypothesis holds under the hypothesis of the government and private 
sector unlimited capacity to borrow from financial markets. In fact, what we will es-
timate is a linear specification of (11) that has the following form: 
 
ti ti ti ti ti mti ti b fti ti u BB a BB a Y a Y a R a R a R a a CA              
*
7 6
*
5 4 3 2 1 0   (12)
 
Coefficients α1, α2, α3 can be either positive or negative: α1>0, if the effect 
coming from the demand side prevails over the effect coming from the supply side of 
the market for F. It implies that as ΔRf increases, CA improves. In other words, the 
higher the increase in foreign interest rates is, the greater the demand for foreign 
bonds by domestic residents is. As F increases, our country’s CA improves. α1<0, if 
the effect of the supply side of the F market prevails. Similarly, α2>0, or α2<0, α4>0, 
α5<0, α6>0, α7<0. uti is the disturbance term. 
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3. Results of the Empirical Research 
 
Our intention has been to test empirically the twin deficit hypothesis for southern 
eurozone countries, over the period 1991-2010 that covers the convergence process, 
the introduction of the euro as well as the economic crisis. For this reason we have 
used panel data from Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, Cyprus and Slovenia.  
 
3.1 Saving – Investment 
 
Before proceeding with the empirical examination of the two deficits it is important 
to examine the saving-investment behavior. The reason is that financial integration 
that led to the reduction in nominal and real interest rates, as well as the optimism 
about the future of the EMU, influenced savings as well as investment interfering in 
the relation of the two deficits. The identity CA=(Sg-Ig)+(Sp-Ip) suggests that our 
preliminary investigation should involve the following relations: 
(i) private savings Sp and private investment Ip. If these two variables are 
positively correlated with correlation coefficient equal to one then the Feldstein-
Horioka puzzle is verified, as well as the twin deficit hypothesis. For any other value 
of the correlation coefficient, the twin deficit hypothesis should be further investi-
gated. So, we should test: 
 
Sp=βo + β1Ip  (13)
 
If β0=0 and β1=1  (13)΄
 
then the Horioka Puzzle is valid and the twin deficit hypothesis is accepted.  
(ii) if the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle doesn’t hold, the relation between net pub-
lic savings, (Sg-Ig), and net private savings, (Sp-Ip), should be investigated. In case 
net public and private savings are positively correlated, the twin deficit hypothesis is 
verified. In case of negative correlation, or, of no correlation at all, the twin deficit 
hypothesis should be further examined. We should test: 
 
(Sg-Ig)= γ0+γ1(Sp-Ig)  (14)
 
If γο>0 and γ1>0  (14)΄
 
then, the twin deficit hypothesis holds, otherwise it should be further checked.  
In the special case where: 
 
γο= 0 and γ1= -1  (14)΄΄
 
the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis is valid and the twin deficit hypothesis is re-
jected.  
Testing the above relations involves the following steps. 
First, we check for unit roots, with the standard tests. Secondly, if all or some 
of these variables are not stationary, we test for cointegration and finally we examine 
whether the long run coefficients satisfy conditions (13)΄ or (14)΄. Tables 1, 2 and 3 
summarize the estimated results. Table 1 shows the results for the standard panel unit  
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root tests. These tests are the Kaddour Hadri (2000) z statistic, the Andrew Levin, 
Chien-Fu Lin, and Shang Chu (2002) t* test, the Kyungso Im, Hashem M. Pesaran, 
and Yougcheol Shin (2003) W statistic and the ADF-Fisher Chi square statistic based 
on Gandadharrao Soundabarao Maddala and Shaowen Wu (1999). From Table 1 it is 
inferred that whereas the variable Sp can be considered as stationary, Ip, (Sg-Ig) and 
(Sp-Ip) cannot. Therefore we proceed by testing for cointegration. Table 2 displays a 
list of four cointegration tests. These are the Chihwa Kao (1999) residual ADF coin-
tegration test and the Pedroni Panel pp statistic, the Pedroni Panel ADF t statistic and 
the Pedroni Group ADF t statistic, as described in Peter Pedroni (1999, 2004). These 
tests except for the last one assume cross section independence. Most of the per-
formed tests for the existence of cointegrating vector suggest that private investment 
and private savings are cointegrated. The same is true for net government savings 
(Sg-Ig) and net private savings,(Sp-Ip).Table 3 demonstrates the estimated coeffi-
cients for the long run relationships. The method of estimation is the Panel Least 
Square with cross section weights performed with EViews 7.0. As can be observed, 
conditions (13)΄and (14)΄ are not satisfied. Their rejection does not imply the rejec-
tion of the twin deficit hypothesis, which should be further investigated. 
 
Table 1   Unit Root Tests (Panel Data for Deficit Eurozone Countries, 1991-2010) 
Variables  Hadri z statistic  Levin, Lin 
and Chu t* 
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-statistic 
ADF-Fisher  
Chi-square 
Sp  5.66* -2.26* -1.57** 22.89***
Ip  2.62* -0.76 -1.21 18.18
(Sg-Ig)  0.91* 1.35 9.72
(Sp-Ip)  2.31 -0.67 18.65
 
Note: The asterisks *, **, *** correspond to statistics according to which, the Ho hypothesis of a unit root, cannot be rejected 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Table 2   Cointegration Tests (Panel Data for Deficit Eurozone Countries, 1991-2010) 
Variables Kao  test  Pedroni Panel pp 
statistic 
Pedroni Panel ADF 
statistic 
Pedroni Group ADF 
statistic 
Ip, Sp  4.55 -3.56 * -3.39* -1.68**
(Sg-Ig), (Sp-Ip)  -1.61** -1.14 -2.06** -1.23***
 
Note: The asterisks *, **, *** correspond to statistic according to which, the Ho hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be 
rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Table 3   Estimated Coefficients of Cointegration Equation  
(Panel Data for Deficit Eurozone Countries, 1991-2010) 
 
Equation  β0 β1 γ0 γ1
Sp=βo + β1Ip          27.72* -0.49*
(Sg-Ig) = γ0 + γ1(Sp-Ig)  -3.72* -0.40*
 
Note: The asterisk, *, denotes statistical significance of relevant coefficients at the 1% level of significance. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
It should be noted that Ip and Sp are inversely related. In addition, the excess 
government savings,(Sg-Ig) and the excess private savings, (Sp-Ip) are inversely re-
lated. This could support a weak Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis. This inverse 
association suggests that the expansion of the government excess savings in the euro- 
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zone deficit countries have led to the crowding out of the private sector excess sav-
ings. Therefore, as there is no certainty about whether the twin deficit hypothesis is 
rejected, we proceed by estimating the portfolio model. 
 
3.2 Estimation of the Portfolio Model 
 
The purpose of this section is to estimate equation (12) with panel data from the defi-
cit eurozone countries and from Germany, representing the “foreign” surplus country 
of our theoretical framework. With the intention to make data from different coun-
tries more comparable and also correct for inflation, data on the CA and budget bal-
ances are expressed as percentages of GDP. We have replaced ΔΥ with GDP growth, 
y, and for Germany ΔΥ* is replaced with Germany’s GDP growth, yg. Initially, we 
have tested for data stationarity. Table 7 reports the Hadri (2000) z statistic, the 
ADF-Fisher Chi square statistic, which are the most commonly used tests based on 
individual processes. According to these tests, stationarity of the variables cannot be 
rejected at the 1% or 5% level of significance, with the exception of the BB/GDP 
ratio and the relative growth of output y/yg. For these two cases stationarity can be 
rejected, on the basis of Hadri z statistic. In addition, the Pesaran (2007) test has been 
performed. This assumes heterogeneity in the autoregressive coefficient of the 
Dickey Fuller regression and allows for the presence of a single unobserved common 
factor. According to the Pesaran (2007) test, stationariy can be rejected for the differ-
ence in long run and short run interest rates. 
The stationarity of the CA as a share of GDP for the southern eurozone coun-
tries, as well as for Germany has important implications for the Current Account 
deficit sustainability. Similar implications can be drawn from the stationarity of the 
budget balance with respect to GDP. Current Account deficit stationarity for EU and 
non-EU countries has been investigated with an AR-based boot strap approach to the 
Hadri (2000) test by Mark J. Holmes, Jesus Otero, and Theodore Panagiotidis 
(2010a). Also Holmes, Otero, and Panagiotidis (2010b) have performed an AR boot-
strap approach to Hadri and Yao Rao (2008) test that supports stationarity and sus-
tainability for thirteen EU countries. Concerning our test results, the fact that 
CA/GDP stationarity is rejected by the Hadri z test, suggests that stationariy should 
by further investigated. 
Next we proceed with the estimation of (12), although there could be doubts 
about the stationarity of some variables. Empirical results obtained with EViews are 
reported in Table 5 that contains three alternative estimations of (12). The additional 
explanatory variable included in the estimation of (12) is competitiveness. In column 
(1) competitiveness is represented by the relative price expressed as the Harmonized 
Consumer Price Index of the southern eurozone countries with respect to Germany’s. 
Column (2) includes the real effective exchange rate and column (3), the terms of 
trade measured as the price of exports with respect to the price of imports. Data on 
alternative measures of competitiveness and all other variables are taken from the 
AMECO data base of the European Commission. 
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Table 4 Unit Root Tests (Panel Data for Deficit Eurozone Countries, 1991-2010) 
 
 
Variable 
 
Panel data for deficit eurozone countries, 
1991-2010  Single variable unit root tests 
Test statistic
Hadri 
z statistic 
ADF-Fisher 
Chi-square 
Pesaran (2007)
Chi-square 
ADF Phillips-Peron 
CA/Y  
(CA balance/GDP) 
2.35* 19.12 -2.7*  
ΔRb 
(Annual change in the  
long run interest rate of  
southern eurozone countries) 
5.54* 26.06* 1.2  
ΔRf 
(Annual change in the long  
run interest rate of Germany) 
7.79* 10.13 -5.52*
 
 
-5.79* 
ΔRm 
(Short run interest rate) 
5.52* 16.53 0.1  
ΒB/GDP 
(Budget balance of southern 
countries as a share of GDP) 
0.97 23.11** -4.9*  
BBg/GDPg 
(Germany’s budget  
balance /GDP) 
0.28* 29.88* 6.54* -5.54* 
y/yg 
Relative real output growth 
1.20 82.61* -2.9*  
Relative prices 
(Based on Harmonized  
Consumer Price Index) 
7.66* 41.43* 44.01*  
REER 
(Real Effective Exchange Rate) 
6.67* 54.68* -6.1*  
TOT 
(Terms of Trade) 
5.60* 25.03* -2.9*  
 
Note: The asterisks *, **, *** correspond to statistics according to which, the Ho hypothesis of a unit root  
cannot be rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
Table 5   Estimation of the Portfolio Model for the Southern Eurozone Countries with  
Current Account Deficits, 1991-2010 
Method of Estimation: Panel Two-Stage EGLS (cross section weights)
Dependent Variable: CA/GDP                             
Independent variables  (1) (2) (3) 
ΔRb 
(Annual change in the long run 
interest rate of southern euro-
zone countries) 
-0.611* -0.908*  -1.407** 
ΔRm 
(Short run interest rate) 
-0.040 -0.154  -0.198 
ΒB/GDP 
(Budget balance of southern 
countries as a share of GDP) 
0.171*** 0.390*  0.247** 
BBg/GDPg 
(Germany’s budget  
balance as share of Ger-
many’s GDP) 
-0.243* -0.610*  -0.413* 
y/yg 
Relative real output growth 
-0.004* -0.008*  -0.004*  
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Relative prices 
(Harmonized Consumer Price 
Index) 
-0.108*     
REER  
(Real Effective Exchange 
Rate) 
 -12.270**   
TOT  
(Terms of Trade) 
   -0.348** 
Constant 6.415*** 7.378 31.041* 
Adjusted R-squared  0.871 0.887 0.752 
Standard error of regression 2.560 2.078  
F-statistic (probability) 62.346  (0.00) 84.248(0.00)  
Total panel observations  
(unbalanced) 
106 110  107 
Instruments used  REER(-1),
y(-1), CA/GDP(-1) 
REER(-1),
y(-1), CA/GDP(-1) 
TOT(-1), 
y(-1), CA/GDP(-1) 
 
Note: The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance of relevant coefficients at the 1%, 5% level and 10% level of 
significance, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The method of estimation is the Two Stages Least Square with cross section 
weights. Subsequently, in Table 5, we observe the following. 
First, concerning the effect of fiscal policies: the budget balance and the CA 
as percentages of GDP are positively related as implied by the positive and signifi-
cant coefficients of BB/GDP in columns (1)-(3).This is consistent with the prediction 
of our model, as α6 coefficient is expected to be positive, verifying the twin deficit 
hypothesis. It is reminded that the channel of influence from the budget balance to 
the Current Account balance is through the bonds market: an expansionary fiscal 
policy is financed through the issue of government bonds. If increased supply of 
bonds is met by higher demand, then the change in B, ΔΒ is positive and exerts a de-
teriorating effect on the CA balance, through equation (3), which is CA=Δ(F-B). If 
ΔΒ>0 and ΔF=0, then the CA is negative. 
Germany’s budget balance as a percentage of its GDP is inversely related to 
the CA/GDP of the deficit southern eurozone countries as expected from our model 
which predicts a negative value for α7. This suggests that domestic as well as foreign 
fiscal policies are equally important in affecting external imbalances in the eurozone. 
So, an expansionary fiscal policy in Germany reduces the CA deficits of southern 
eurozone countries. And of course the opposite is true, that is, a tightening fiscal pol-
icy in Germany widens the deficits of the southern eurozone countries. If this is true, 
an underlying hypothesis with regard to twin deficits for Germany must hold. Never-
theless, this must be empirically investigated. 
Secondly, about the effect of interest rates: in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, 
specific coefficients are estimated for the variation in the long run interest rates, ΔRb 
and ΔRf.  
The negative sign on ΔRb can be explained as follows. Increasing reductions 
in Rb causes the deterioration in the CA balance (as a percentage of GDP). Accord-
ing to our theoretical approach, the worsening of the CA is the outcome of a positive 
effect on the supply of B, which deteriorates the CA. Hence, for periods of declining 
interest rates, increasing negative changes in the long run interest rate is matched  
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with wider CA deficits. This happens because governments as well as the private 
sector can benefit by increasing their borrowing (issuing bonds) under the condition 
of fast falling interest rates. Therefore, widening CA deficits of the southern euro-
zone countries over the period of 1991-2000 have been, to a certain extent, the result 
of sharp reductions in long run interest rates (Figure 4). We could, therefore, claim 
that the deteriorating CA balances of the deficit eurozone countries have been, to a 
certain degree, the result of financial integration and deregulation of the capital mar-
kets. The opposite effect is true. That is decreasing variations in the interest rates – as 
in the period after 2000 - are related with improving CA balances as a percentage of 
GDP. Convergence of interest rates among the EMU countries should, in part, ex-
plain an improvement in CA balances after the introduction of the Euro. 
Thirdly, regarding the GDP growth y and y*: their coefficient is equal but of 
opposite sign. Contrary to what our model predicts an increase in the difference of 
output growth in the South has a deteriorating effect on the CA balance. This out-
come is in line to the Keynesian tradition. 
Fourthly, estimated coefficients of alternative measures of competitiveness in 
columns (1)-(3) are negative supporting the view that a loss in competitiveness leads 
to a deteriorations of the CA balance. 
 
3.3 Implications for the Greek Economy 
 
The results of our empirical investigation for the deficit eurozone countries hold for 
Greece as well. Hence, the deterioration of the Greek CA during the last two decades 
can be attributed to some extent to the financial integration and the introduction of 
the euro. The sharp decline in the interest rates in the 1990s made borrowing easier 
for the public as well as for the private sector. Also, we found that fiscal policies are 
of importance. Most surprisingly, German fiscal policy, representing the policies of 
the EU core euro countries, is of importance for the Greek Current Account. The 
twin deficit hypothesis therefore holds for the case of Greece. The Greek CA can 
improve through policies promoting the improvement of the country’s competitive-
ness, that is, the Greek relative unit cost must decline. This cannot be achieved only 
by introducing horizontal cuts in incomes of public and private sector wage earners
4. 
There are alternative policies that can be put into effect, such as promoting invest-
ment, technologies and innovations in exporting sectors and cutting taxes on selected 
products or industries. Unfortunately, the economic and political developments that 
have brought the country to the brink of default have created insecurity about the 
future and adverse expectations. These, together with severe and repeated wage cuts, 
have led domestic spending and investment to a nadir level. Given the economic en-
vironment of insecurity and instability, the country’s competitiveness has declined, 
despite the decrease in the relative unit labour cost. The importance of the German 
Budget Balance in affecting the Greek CA indicates the crucial role that policy fac-
tors in the core countries of the EU can play. Unlimited lending to the Greek gov-
ernment to pay its debts will not help the country to recover from recession. On the 
contrary, a better synchronization of fiscal and monetary policy program for the eu-
                                                        
4 As the 2010, 2011 and 2012 adjustment programs of the EU and IMF dictate.  
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rozone as a whole could be more successful if adjusted according to the needs of 
each country individually. It must be noted that the criteria of the Stability Growth 
Pact were repeatedly violated in the past by many countries for various reasons.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this study we have examined the effect of the government deficit on the CA bal-
ance. Initially, we studied descriptive information about the fiscal developments, the 
financial situation and the CA of the southern eurozone countries. During the post 
Maastricht period, the CA balances of these countries have been in deficit. This con-
trasts with northern or core eurozone countries that have CA surpluses. Then we con-
structed a portfolio model incorporating the effect from financial integration and the 
creation of the euro. According to this the channel of influence from fiscal policy to 
the CA balance is the bond market, from where governments and the private sector 
can borrow. Finally we have tested our portfolio model with panel data from the 
countries of the southern euro area and Germany, representing the surplus countries 
of northern eurozone for the period 1991-2010. The conclusions we have drawn can 
be summarized as follows. 
First, the twin deficit hypothesis is confirmed. An expansionary fiscal policy 
worsens the CA and the opposite of course, holds. This is true for the eurozone coun-
tries with CA deficits. The sample of deficit countries includes Greece, Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, France, Cyprus and Slovenia.  
Secondly, fiscal policy of the surplus eurozone countries represented in our 
empirical examination by Germany influences the CA balances of the countries of 
southern eurozone. We found that expansionary (contractionary) fiscal policy of the 
German government improves (deteriorates) the CA deficits of the countries of the 
south. 
Thirdly, fluctuations in the long run as well in short run interest rates affect the 
CA. A sharp decline in long run and short run interest rates, as during the 1991-1999 
period has a deteriorating effect on the CA. Variations in the German long run inter-
est rates also influence the CA deficits of the South with an opposite sign. 
Fourthly, competitiveness, measured as the relative unit labour cost, is impor-
tant. An improvement in competitiveness reduces the CA deficit. 
In brief, the interdependence between south eurozone and core eurozone coun-
tries is crucial in determining CA imbalances within the EMU. For the elimination of 
these imbalances fiscal coordination, but not uniformity is important. Unilateral deci-
sions such as reductions in the government budget balance are inadequate for the 
elimination of external distortions. Additionally, fiscal rules followed by all eurozone 
countries uniformly would be incapable of eliminating CA imbalances in the euro 
area. 
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